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The Utility of Finance 
 
 
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer* & Eric Talley** 
  June 2017  
 PRELIMINARY DRAFT -- DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
Abstract: Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs) are charged with regulating a public utility’s rates 
at levels that serve the public’s interest while allowing the utility’s investors to earn a rate 
commensurate with that expected by businesses facing similar risks. Although the process of 
adjusting rates for risk is a staple of modern finance, we know surprisingly little about how well 
accomplish their regulatory mandate when judged against the benchmarks of financial economics. 
This article analyzes a dozen years’ worth of gas and electric rate-setting decisions from PUCs in 
the United States and Canada, demonstrating empirically that allowed returns on equity (ROE) 
diverge significantly and systematically from the predictions of accepted asset pricing 
methodologies in finance. Our analysis suggests that current regulatory practice more plausibly 
reflects an amalgam of other non-finance desiderata, including political goals, incentive provision, 
and regulatory capture. For example, elected PUCs award significantly lower ROEs than appointed 
ones.  We nevertheless conjecture that the divergence of observed regulatory behavior from asset-
pricing fundamentals may be due (in part) to a lack of financial valuation expertise among 
regulators. To test this conjecture, we study a unique field experiment that exposed commissioners 
and their staffs to immersion training in finance. We find evidence that treated PUCs began to 
issue ROE rulings that were (moderately) more aligned with standard asset pricing theory than 
those of untreated placebo groups.  Our results suggest that it is possible to train non-expert legal 
and regulatory decision-makers to exhibit greater fidelity to principles of financial economics. 
                                                          
* Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Law School.  
** Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Email: etalley@law.columbia.edu 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the last three decades, a dramatic transformation has been underway in regulatory 
areas where time and risk valuation affect legal outcomes: The steady growth in the centrality of 
financial valuation methodologies. While such approaches were generally foreign to legal and 
regulatory decision-making in the early 1980s, corporate finance now permeates a vast and 
growing set of doctrinal areas, ranging from securities fraud, to corporate law, to tax and to mergers 
and acquisitions.1    
Among this burgeoning set of applications, the advance of finance into regulation of public 
utilities was perhaps particularly inevitable. Indeed, the challenge of scrutinizing rates of return 
has long been a key element of utilities regulation, reflecting an expansive conception of necessary 
state and federal regulatory power over the actions of natural monopolies, often with important 
economic implications in play.2 As is well known, the legal governance of public utilities is 
designed to ensure that the utility provides critical services to the public at reasonable costs, and 
to protect consumers against bargaining inequalities, informational disadvantage, collusive 
pricing, and market inefficiency due to the public’s dependency on the continuous provision of 
public necessity.  At the same time, for both legal and practical reasons, regulators must also allow 
utilities’ capital providers to recoup a competitive rate of return on their investments. Accordingly, 
public utility commissions (PUCs) are vested with power to supervise, administer and regulate the 
economic activities of utilities, all in the name of striking this balance.   
A key component of the utilities regulation process thus pertains to regulating prices that 
yield an appropriate risk-adjusted return that utilities are entitled to earn.  This mandate goes back 
at least a full century, reflected in the famous Bluefield Waterworks edict from the United States 
Supreme Court: 
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of 
the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally 
being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments 
in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55(3) JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
(September 2005). 
2 William  J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in CORPORATIONS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139-159 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Willian J. Novak, eds., 2017).  
  
4 
 
uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to such profits as are realized or anticipated 
in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.3 
It was not until decades after Bluefield, however, that advances in financial economics made it 
practically possible to address the above mandate formally, using a variety of asset-pricing 
methodologies. A prime example of such methodological approaches is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model—or CAPM—one of a host of now well-accepted approaches for determining how to adjust 
expected rates of return for anticipated risks.4   
Yet, to what extent do rate regulators render decisions that comport with standard financial 
methodology in their decision-making process?  This paper offers an empirical analysis of rates 
awarded by public utility commissions (PUCs), evaluating their relationship to factors that 
standard finance theory predicts would drive expected ROEs. We analyze data of nearly a thousand 
PUCs gas and electric rate-setting decisions over a twelve-year period (2005-2016) emanating 
from PUCs across the United States and Canada. Our benchmark for analysis is the lens of 
accepted asset-pricing theories from financial economics.  Specifically, we frame our inquiry with 
a simple and intuitive proposition: 
(a) If regulators set rates of return for public utilities in a manner consistent with their 
presumed legal mandate (i.e., by calibrating awarded returns against investment risk); 
(b) Then adjudicated rates of return should track those prescribed for individual utilities 
according to accepted asset pricing models in finance (such as the CAPM). 
Our analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis above with significant confidence: we 
demonstrate that rate setting practices diverge appreciably (perhaps even violently) from the 
predictions of financial economics across numerous dimensions. For example, awarded gross 
returns on equity (ROEs) tend to exhibit considerable stickiness around focal “odometer” points 
(particularly a flat 10%) regardless of the cyclical structure of other prevailing benchmark rates.  
Moreover, awarded ROE spreads have progressively widened significantly since 2005, even 
                                                          
3 Bluefield Waterworks v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). Accord FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 
320 U.S. 591 (1944) (“The return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other 
enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital”). 
4 DAVID G. LUENBERGER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE (1998).  
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though systematic risk in the utilities industry has fallen continuously during the same period. 
Indeed, if the awarded ROEs were an asset class, they would generate a mean positive abnormal 
return (“alpha”) of between 7.5 and 8.5 percent, an amount that overshadows even the performance 
of Fortune Magazine’s top twenty stock investments for the last decade.5 Moreover, average 
awarded ROEs are strongly inversely related both to company leverage – a correlation that is at 
odds to basic predictions of capital structure. Finally, as anticipated market returns (i.e., systematic 
risk) have fluctuated during the period studied, awarded ROE spreads have consistently (and 
curiously) moved in the opposite direction, notwithstanding the fact that market returns on utilities’ 
equity overwhelmingly have positive betas.  Our analysis thus confidently rejects the hypothesis 
that awarded ROEs behave anywhere near what finance theory predicts would be the expected 
return of a commensurably risky investment. 
What, then, explains the extreme deviation from standard finance theory’s predictions? We 
tentatively identify some factors may be at play, including the possibility that regulators’ behavior 
reflects objectives that are either orthogonal or opposed to precise risk-return calibration, such as 
serving political constituencies, providing dynamic incentives, and possibly even regulatory 
capture. We find evidence that the structural composition of the PUC is reflected in awarded ROEs: 
the percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower awarded ROEs, with completely 
elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower returns on equity than 
completely appointed ones.  This electoral effect may represent the cost that commissioners pay 
with rate payers by setting rates too high, and/or the greater impediments to regulatory capture by 
elected commissioners.  
Higher awarded rates may also aim to sustain an equity cushion designed to improve 
incentives for reliability.6 “Inventorying” power is still beyond the capacity of most generators.  
Sustaining the continuous and uninterrupted electricity service therefore requires maintenance of 
continuous and almost instantaneous balance between production and consumption of electricity 
                                                          
5 See Reviewing Fortune's 20 'Best Investments' Of The Last Decade, Seeking Alpha (9/22/2016, available at 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4007867-reviewing-fortunes-20-best-investments-last-decade) (a gross annualized 
return of 8.1%). 
6 Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole, Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets, 38(1) RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
60-84, 78 (2007).  
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in power systems.7 On certain occasions (such as the Super Bowl), utilities can expect the spike in 
demand, but not all spikes and dips can be foreseen. To mitigate the risk of power shortages and 
blackouts, some margin of excess generation capacity above the expected demand load must be 
kept at all times. Higher awarded rates can sustain investments in excess capacity and may 
theoretically enhance the reliability of energy provision in the light of the volatility of capital 
expenditures and the lack of technical storage feasibility. Moreover, as their status as monopolies 
exclusively providing social necessities renders utilities “too important to fail”,8 rate regulation 
may implicitly function as micro-prudential regulation for public utilities, using the equity cushion 
to mitigate the risk of insolvency and illiquidity.  The prioritization of such other goals may provide 
a cogent account for why PUCs appear to veer so far from accurate calibration of risk-adjusted 
returns. 
That said, we also conjecture that at least part of the reason for the deviation of awarded 
rates from the predictions of financial economics stems from the technical demands that asset 
pricing models place on regulators and their staffs. To test this conjecture, we exploit data from a 
unique field experiment that exposed state-level PUC commissioners and staffs to immersion 
training in asset pricing and finance.  We find some evidence that finance training results in some 
moderate effects on later ROE proceedings, inducing rate decisions that are more closely aligned 
with the predictions of finance.   Our findings suggest that it may be possible to train non-expert 
legal decision-makers to exhibit far greater fidelity to core principles of asset pricing than they are 
otherwise inclined to exhibit.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide a high-level overview of the 
rate-setting process, and its criticality to utility profitability and solvency. There we provide a brief 
overview of some details in formulating the weighted average cost of capital, an all-things-
considered rate of return that combines tax rates, leverage levels, returns on debt and the all-
important return on equity (ROE). We demonstrate how critical (and contentious) ROE 
determinations are to the overall process, and describe prevailing methodologies used by PUCs to 
                                                          
7 Jose Fernando Prada, The Value of Reliability in Power Systems – Pricing Operating Reserves (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Energy Laboratory, Working Paper, 1999); RICHARD BROWN, ELECTRIC POWER 
DISTRIBUTION 15, 143 (2009).  
 
8 Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy versus Bailout of Socially Important Non-Financial 
Institutions, 7(1) HARVARD BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 160 (2017). 
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set it.  Section III describes our data and presents a series of tests of hypothesis that ROE 
determinations mimic the pricing of risk, all of which are rejected.  There we also explore other 
empirical factors that have some predictive power, and demonstrate the effect of finance training 
in substantially counteracting the inconsistencies between rate setting and asset pricing 
predictions.   Section IV concludes. 
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II. Overview of the Regulatory Rate-Setting Process 
Public utilities are widely considered natural monopolies, and regulation is designed to 
mitigate the monopoly costs, so that monopoly prices do not transfer wealth from the energy 
consumers to the stockholders of the firm.9 The welfare loss from the self-rationed production of 
the monopoly is often called “the deadweight costs” of monopoly, as some consumers who would 
have purchased at the competitive price are restricted from purchase, resulting in welfare loss.10  
Vulnerability to the exercise of market power is the primary justification for rate regulation.11 In 
the energy sector, this market power carries significant negative externalities with distributional 
consequences.  Because utilities provide public necessities, and can be conceptualized as 
geographical franchises for energy provision, consumers’ disadvantage, imposition, unreasonable 
charges, harmful prices, and harmful standards of service are also well recognized regulatory 
concerns.12  
For these reasons, prices charged by electric and gas utilities are regulated in the United 
States by a target market capitalization rate for the firm’s common stock.13 The authority for rate 
regulation is divided between the federal government and the states, where the bright line gives 
the federal government, acting through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the 
jurisdiction over the interstate aspects of power and electricity, while the states are granted the 
jurisdiction for intrastate matters, including, most notably, retail sale14.   There are therefore two 
jurisdictions for rate-setting cases: the FERC for utilities providing interstate power infrastructure, 
                                                          
9 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 810 (1975); Gordon 
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 225-26 (1967).  
10 Id.  
11 Severin Borenstein, The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s Restructuring Disaster, 
16(1) THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 191-211 (2002); Erin T. Mansur, Pricing Behavior in the Initial 
Sumer of the Restructured PJM Wholesale Electricity Market. 90(2) THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS 369-
386  (2008); Ali Hortacsu and Steven L. Puller, Understanding Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions: A Case 
Study of the Texas Electricity Spot Market, 39(1) THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 86-114 (2008).  
12 See William J. Novak, supra note 2 id, at 158-159, arguing that “Monopoly was just one of many other important 
factors driving the public utility idea”.  
13 IRSTON R. BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1942). Rate-making is a kind of price-fixing: 
see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 3, 134 (1877).  
14 See Federal Power Commission v. South Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964); Miss. Power & Light Co. 
v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 388 (1988); FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association, 136 S. Ct.  760 
(2016).  
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and the state-based public utility commissions for utilities providing retail intrastate power service.  
The basic principle that guides regulation of electric rates in both jurisdictions is that prices should 
reflect the “cost of service”.15  Among the costs of service, regulators are required to compute the 
utility’s rate of return (ROR), which is typically embodied by the utilities Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital (WACC)—essentially a tax-adjusted weighted average cost of debt and the expected 
return of preferred and common stock that a utility has issued to finance its investments.  The cost 
of debt is usually straightforward, since it is largely observable in a utility’s debt contracts. But 
how much should electric and gas utility stockholders earn? The statutory standard running as a 
scarlet thread throughout energy legislation determines the rates charged by a utility provider 
should be “just and reasonable”16.  
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the fixing of “just and reasonable” rates involves a 
balancing of the investor and the consumer interest: the rate should be sufficient to assure 
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract 
capital, on the one hand, and protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of private utility 
corporations, on the other.17 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return 
on the value of the property it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally 
being made at the same time, and in the same region of the country, on investments in other 
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties18. A “just and 
                                                          
15 I.A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 26-27 (1970); Dr. Karl McDermott, Cost of Service 
Regulation in the Investor-Owned Electric Utility Industry: A History of Adaptation, Edison Electric Institute 
Working Paper (June 2012);  
16 Under the Federal Power Act all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in 
connection with interstate wholesale sales shall be “just and reasonable”; so too all rules and regulations affecting or 
pertaining to such rates or charges: 16 U.S.C.S. § 824(b)(1); 16 U.S. C.S. § 824d(a). If the FERC sees a violation of 
that standard, it must determine the just and reasonable rate and impose it by order: 16 U.S.C.S. § 824e(a).  Similarly, 
many state public utility statues contain provisions permitting commission authorizations to regulate “just and 
reasonable rates”. See for example AL Code § 37-1-80 (2013) requiring that “the rates for the services rendered and 
required shall be reasonable and just to both the utility and the public. Every utility shall be entitled to such just and 
reasonable rates as will enable it at all times to fully perform its duties to the public, and will, under honest, efficient 
and economical management, earn a fair net return on the reasonable value of its property devoted to the public’s 
service”.  
 
17 Federal Power Commission et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, (1943); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923).  
18 Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission of the State of West Virginia et 
al., 262 U.S. 679 (1922), reasoning that “Rates which ae not sufficient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the 
property used… are unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives the public utility company 
of its property, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment”.  
  
10 
 
reasonable” rate should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of 
the utility, and should be adequate to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the 
money necessary for its continued operation19.  Investors’ confidence and capital attractiveness are 
particularly salient for utilities because utilities in financial distress are likely to be sponsored, 
subsidized or bailed-out by taxpayers due to their unique position as situational monopolies 
providing of essential services.20 An operating failure of the public utility, whether due to 
illiquidity, insolvency, or simple shortage of power supply, is expected to induce a public crisis of 
confidence, as the social and economic infrastructure of our lives is a based on an implied 
assumption of continuous and uninterrupted electricity provision.  
The statutory mandate to regulate public utility’s ROEs to a just and reasonable level leaves 
rate regulators in somewhat of a methodological No Man’s Land. State public utility commissions 
are generally free to establish ad-hoc their methodology in rate setting procedures. Perhaps due to 
its ease of use and comprehension by regulators not necessarily particularly vested in financial 
theories, the most popular method used to determine the ROE among state public utility 
commissions is what they refer to as the discounted cash-flow (DCF) approach,21 which is a variant 
on the Gordon Dividend-Growth model and conceives of the price of a stock to be present 
discounted value of its future perpetual dividend stream. The FERC has officially adopted the DCF 
two-step methodology as its preferred method for ROE computation, based on the underlying 
premise that an investment is worth the present value of the infinite stream of dividends discounted 
at a market rate commensurate with the investment’s risk22. Rearranged to solve for the required 
rate of return, the formula known as the constant growth DCF model can be expressed as follows:  
 
ROE = 𝐷𝐷 ∙ (1 + θ ∙ E(g))
𝑃𝑃0
+ E(g),  (1) 
                                                          
19 Id, p. 692.  
20 Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Too Important to Fail, supra note 8 id.  
21 Kenneth Gordon and Jeff D. Makholm, Allowed Return on Equity in Canada and the United States: An Economic, 
Financial and Institutional Analysis, NERA Economic Consulting Working Paper 20 (2008). It bears noting that what 
the PUC utilities community refers to as a DCF approach is somewhat more specialized than what finance practitoners 
think of it as entailing. Because this paper is about utilities regulation, however, we adhere to that industry’s 
nomenclature. 
22 The FERC has adopted DCF as its main methodology for analyses of required rate of return in the 1970’s. See, e.g., 
Minn. Power and Light Co., 3 FERC 61,045 at 61, 132-22 (1978).  
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where D is the current dividend, 𝑃𝑃0 is the price of the common stock during the regulatory testing 
period, E(g) is the expected growth rate in dividends, and θ is an adjustment factor to account for 
the “lumpy” payment of dividends.23 As many of the utility providers are public corporations, the 
price of their common stock and their dividend yield component are in the public domain24. For 
the constant dividend growth rate, the FERC uses a two-step procedure, averaging short-term and 
long-term growth estimates.25 The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES)’s five-year 
forecast for each company in the proxy group, is used to determine the expected growth for the 
short term26. The long-term growth rate—which is almost always lower—is based on forecasts of 
long-term growth of the economy as a whole, as reflected in GDP: public utilities are assumed to 
sustain long term growth consistent with the growth of the economy as a whole.27 The practice 
endorsed by the FERC to compute the anticipated perpetuity growth rate is to accord the short-
term forecast receives a two-thirds weighting and the long-term forecast receives a one-third 
weighting.28  
The two-step DCF methodology is purportedly used by the FERC to establish a zone of 
reasonablenesss for ROEs. Yet, an ROE may be both within the realm of reasonableness and be 
considered unjust and unreasonable: in other words, not all ROEs within the purported “zone” are 
                                                          
23 Under the FERC’s approach, 𝜃𝜃 is pegged at 0.5, so that the dividend yield is multiplied by the expression (1+.5E(g)) 
to account for the fact that dividends are paid on a quarterly basis. Multiplying the dividend yield in this manner 
increases the dividend yield by one half of the anticipated growth rate and produces what the FERC refers to as the 
“adjusted dividend yield”. See Massachusetts Attorney General et al. v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company et al., 147 
FERC 61, 234 (2014).  
24 For the dividend yield component, the FERC uses a single, average dividend yield based on the indicated dividend 
and the average of the monthly high and low stock prices over a six-month period. See e.g., Portland Natural Gas 
Transmission Sys., Opinion No. 510, 13 FERC 61, 129, at pp 232-234 (2011).  
25 Massachusetts Attorney General et al. v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company et al, supra note 23 id, p. 10.  
26 Earnings forecasts made by investment analysts are considered the best estimate of short-term dividend growth 
because they are likely relied on by investors when making their investment decisions. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line 
Corp., Opinion No. 414-B, 85 FERC 61, 323, at 62,269 & n. 34 (1998).  
27 Opinion No. 396-B, 79 FERC at 62, 382-82; Opinion No, 396-C, 81 FERC 61, 036 (1997), cited at Massachusetts 
Attorney General et al. v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company et al, supra note 23 id, p. 12. Up until the Bangor Hydro 
opinion in 2014, the FERC used a one-step DCF methodology for utility providers, which lacked a long-term growth 
projection.  
28 “Given the greater reliability of the short term projection, we believe it is appropriate to give it greater weight” – 
see Opinion No. 414-A, 84 FERC at 61, 423-24. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (D.C. Circuit) affirmed this two thirds/one third weighting for determine the overall dividend growth estimate 
at CAPP v. FERC, 254 F. 3d at 297 (2001).  
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truly just and reasonable29. To inform the just and reasonable placement of the ROE within the 
zone of reasonableness, the FERC uses a variety of alternative risk-pricing approaches, such as 
risk-premium benchmarking, the CAPM (discussed below), and expected earnings analysis30.  In 
addition, record evidence of state commission-approved ROEs is taken into account, and although 
not used directly to establish utilities’ ROEs31, state commission ROEs do serve as an indicator for 
an adjustment within the zone of reasonableness to satisfy the level sufficient to attract 
investment32.  
Although seemingly well accepted among regulators, for a variety of reasons the DCF / 
Gordon Growth approach to imputing risk-adjusted returns is not widely followed by financial 
professionals or other legal actors charged with risk pricing. For example, most recent Delaware 
courts opinions in appraisal matters underlying fairness opinions33 rely on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM)34 or the Fama-French model35 as the preferred methods for estimation of the 
company’s cost of capital36. The popularity of CAPM with finance professionals is based on its 
assessment of the relationship of investments with risk37. The basic intuition that underlies CAPM 
                                                          
29 Association of Business Advocating Tariff Equity et al. v. Midcontinent Independent System et al., 156 FERC 
61060, 8 (2016); So. Cal. Edison v. FERC, 717 F. 3d at 181-82 (2013).  
30 ROGER A. MORIN, NEW REGULATORY FINANCE 108 (2006).  
31 “State commission ROEs are established at different times in different jurisdictions which use different policies, 
standards and methodologies in setting rates” – see Middle South Services, Inc., Opinion No. 12, 16 FERC 61,101, 
at 61,221 (1981); see also:  Boston Edison Co., Opinion No. 411, 77 FERC 61,272 at 62,171-62,172 (1996): ; Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co., Opinion No. 408, 77 FERC at 61, 002.  
32 Bangor Hydro-Electric Company et al, supra note 23 id, p 72: “we are faced with circumstances under which the 
midpoint of the zone of reasonableness established… has fallen below state commission approved ROEs, even though 
transmission entails unique risks that state-regulated electric distribution does not… the discrepancy between state 
ROEs and the… midpoint serves as an indicator that an upward adjustment is necessary to satisfy Hope and Bluefield”.  
33 Under 8.Del.C. § 262(h), upon finding that a stockholder is entitled to an appraisal, the court must determine the 
fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment of the proposed transaction.  
R. Scott Widen, Delaware Law, Financial Theory and Investment Banking Valuation Practice, 4 NYU Journal of Law 
and Business 578 (2010); Gaurav Jetley and Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage – Is There a Delaware Advantage? 71 The 
Business Lawyer 427 (2016).  
34 See TIM KOTLER, MARC GOEDHART AND DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION 293-315 (2005). Formulaically, the CAPM 
posits that an asset’s expected return, 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴) is given by the expression: 𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴) = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 + β𝐴𝐴 ∙ �E(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀) − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓�, where 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 
denotes the risk free rate, E(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀) denotes the expected return on the market portfolio, and β𝐴𝐴is the asset’s “beta” – a 
measure of risk relative to the market. 
35 Widen notes that the Fama-French model has been used by Delaware Courts in addition to, or instead of, CAPM 
(p. 582), supra note 33 id. The Fama-French model expands on CAPM by adding size and value factors to the 
market risk factor in CAPM.  
36 Jetley and Ji, id.  
37 See IVO WELCH, THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL, IN CORPORATE FINANCE 215 (2017), stating that “every 
finance dinosaur in the real world is using it”.  
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is that returns and risk go together like a horse and carriage: CAPM provides a method for 
quantifying the stock’s risk and its expected influence on the expected return for investors.38 
According to the CAPM, the key to assessing the value of a security is to assess the response of 
the returns of this security to the returns on the market index. The beta coefficient, β, is defined as 
the sensitivity of the return of that security to the return of the “market” portfolio.   
When valuing businesses, the Delaware courts strongly prefer the CAPM (or similar 
models) for determining risk-adjusted discount rates.  However, once that rate is determined, 
something akin to the dividend-growth model is frequently applied to predict the company’s 
“terminal” value as a stream of cash flows growing consistently in perpetuity. In those 
applications, Delawere courts have pegged the anticipated perpetuity-growth rate as necessarily 
living within the range of values between the anticipated rate of inflation and the anticipated 
nominal GDP growth.39  The rate of inflation is considered a floor for a terminal value estimate 
for a solidly profitable company,40 while the expected GDP growth rate is considered a ceiling for 
corporations in mature industries.41 As is well known by many finance practitioners (though 
perhaps not appreciated in by utilities regulators), a long-term perpetuity growth rate for a firm in 
excess of the anticipated GDP growth rate would imply that the firm in question would 
mechanically come to dominate the entire economy in the long term – a prediction seen by most 
as simply untenable.42  
In theory, employing different valuation methodologies for rate setting purposes need not 
necessarily yield different results. The divergence between the PUCs’ preferred model of DCF 
analysis and the more widely accepted CAPM model may be one of approach, but not outcome. 
With appropriate inputs, and a reliable market price, the DCF approach should yield a discount 
rate that is similar to that used by market participants. What is less clear, however, is whether the 
inputs into the DCF approach are, on the whole, reliable. In particular, the expected dividend 
growth rate—or E(g)— used to compute valuations under the DCF model is ultimately and 
                                                          
38  Compare: Love and Marriage (Frank Sinatra, lyrics by Sammy Cahn, 1955).  
39 Leo Strine at Global GT LP v.  Golden Telecom, p. 26-27, id.  
40 See Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. Pf Am., Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); Peter A. 
Hunt, STRUCTURING MERGES & ACQUISITIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE 51 (2009).  
41 MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, CORPORATE FINANCE: A FOCUSED APPROACH 242 (2009).   
42 It is worth noting that there are other alternatives to the CAPM, and that the CAPM has its share of weaknesses 
too; however, it remains a dominant measure of risk-adjustment in finance.  
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inherently a prediction about the future. Accurate and reasonable projected estimates of the 
perpetuity growth rate in dividends could thus yield ROE valuation outcomes similar and even 
identical to those inferred by CAPM.  The actual degree of divergence of valuations inferred by 
different decision makers through different valuation methodologies is an empirical question. In 
the next section of the article, we turn to empirically assess this question in the context of gas and 
electric utilities ROEs awarded by PUCs across the nation over the period 2005-2016. 
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III. Data and Empirical Tests 
This section draw on data from actual rate hearings in gas and electric utilities over a 
twelve-year period, evaluating the extent to which the rate setting process mimics a risk-adjusted 
return mandate.  Our approach will be to treat the awarded return on equity from a rate hearing as 
a type of “asset price”, exploring whether such returns in a manner similar to the returns on an 
equity investment yielding similar returns. 
A. Data and Summary Statistics 
We use as our primary data source the Public Utilities Fortnightly (PUF) ROE database, 
which we hand-collected from 2005 through 2016.  The PUF data report on awarded  ROEs in gas 
and utilities rate hearings, across all fifty US states, several Canadian provinces, and the District 
of Columbia.  We augmented this data set by merging it with a variety of other data sources.  First, 
we added data on several macroeconomic variables that would have been available to the PUC 
decision makers at the time of each rate hearing, including data on benchmark rates (such as US 
Treasuries) and widely-utilized forward-looking predictions on the market equity risk premium 
(taken from Duff & Phelps annual survey).  We also collected Compustat and CRSP data for all 
publicly traded utilities in our sample (or, in many cases, on their publicly traded parents and 
holding companies), which included firm-specific information on assets, liabilities, accounting 
returns, and securities market pricing.  To this, we added PUC-specific data from the Institute for 
Public Utilities at Michigan State University, tabulating the composition, elected/appointed nature 
and political party representation on state PUCs.  Finally, for a later manipulation, we included 
data on a quasi-field experiment in which state PUC commissioners and staffs received immersion 
training in finance and valuation on temporally staggered basis. 
We begin with summary statistics before proceeding to present results of a series of 
regression analyses. Consider first the Raw PUF data, which reports on awarded ROEs in 
announced regulatory hearings. Figure 1 provides a histogram of awarded ROEs for the entire 
sample.  Note from the Figure that there is considerable heterogeneity around the population mean 
of 10.1%. At the same time, however, awarded ROEs exhibit an appreciable mode at exactly 10%, 
no doubt a focal point for regulators.  Indeed, we find that this mode at 10% persists over time. 
  
16 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 The PUF data report on both gas and electric rate hearings, with a small number of 
combined gas and electric opinions.  Table 1 compares the population of gas rate cases to electric 
cases.  Overall, awarded electric ROEs are very slightly larger than those for gas, with a gap of 
around twenty basis points that tends to widen at the upper ranges of awarded ROEs (sixty basis 
points at the 95th percentile).  While still not statistically significant without controlling for other 
covariates, this gap will be born out with more comprehensive analysis below, and may reflect 
additional considerations that high-end electrical generation / transmission projects receive (e.g., 
solar arrays).  Although will treat gas and electric rate cases in the same analysis below, we will 
typically control for the type of case. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 reports on awarded ROEs subdivided by jurisdiction (including three Canadian 
provinces).  Note from the table that there does appear to be some heterogeneity between 
jurisdictions.  For example, several states in the South seem to have higher awarded ROEs.  There 
many reasons for this heterogeneity, but it suggests the prudence of allowing for jurisdictional-
level fixed effects as well as clustering standard errors at the state level in the regressions we report 
below. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Figure 2a considers awarded ROEs over time, as a function of the order date in the 
regulatory rate-setting decision.  Note from the figure that there is a slight decreasing trend in 
awarded ROEs over time, starting at nearly 11% in 2005 but decreasing over time to around 9.5% 
by 2016.  Interestingly, however, the overall reduction in awarded ROEs is not accompanied by 
lower variation in announced rates, which stays roughly consistent over the entire period.  
Notwithstanding this aggregate variation over time, it is still clear from Figure 2a that the modal 
cluster of ROE awards at 10 percent remains persistent throughout the observational period.  
Of course, raw awarded ROEs are not particularly well suited to compare to other financial 
asset prices, without controlling for capital returns. Table 2b thus considers awarded ROE spreads 
over a (roughy) risk-free benchmark: 20-year Treasury bond yields. Note from the Figure that, 
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unlike Figure 2 there is a clear and strong upward linear trajectory in awarded ROEs, from around 
5.5% in 2005 to approximately 7.5% in 2016.  It is also clearly more cyclical than the raw ROEs, 
suggesting that the rate setting process may be more impervious to cycles in financial markets than 
the financial assets it is meant to mimic.  Nearly identical dynamics can be found against other 
benchmarks. 
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b Here] 
It is noteworthy from Figure 2b that awarded ROE spreads have not only been cyclical, but 
that they have widened over time.  It is entirely possible, of course, that allowable ROE spreads 
have widened during this period because utilities stocks have become more risky during that same 
period.  However, Figures 3a and 3b shed considerable doubt on that hypothesis.  Figure 3b tracks 
monthly CAPM beta estimates of all publicly traded utilities in the PUF data set (based on a 60-
month trailing estimate).  As is typical of utilities betas, they tend to be below the market-wide 
measure of 1.0 (though not uniformly).  Note that after a slight increasing trend through 2007, 
equity betas for utilities began a steady decline starting in 2008, and became overall much less 
volatile through at least the end of 2015.  If utilities stocks as a whole were becoming increasingly 
risky over the period studied, we would expect that utility would be climbing as well. But as can 
be seen from the figure, the utilities-index beta is generally falling over this period. Figure 2a 
tracks the abnormal returns of utilities over this period, which were very slightly (but not 
statistically significantly) higher than zero.   
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b Here] 
 Finally, although not strictly an application of asset pricing, it is perhaps worth asking 
whether utilities’ realized ROE after a rate hearing matches up well with the awarded ROE.  This 
inquiry is in some ways circular, since the rate case is meant to lock in a subsequent ROE.  
However, utilities may incur costs or investments in assets after the rate case that cause this 
mechanical identity to fail. Figure 4 provides a histogram of the extent to which awarded ROEs 
exceeded the mean realized ROE in the two years after the rate case.  As can be seen from the 
figure, awarded ROEs appear to overshoot realized ROEs by between 1.5 and 1.75 percent—a 
figure that (while not statistically distinct from zero) raises some general questions about how well 
utilities rate setting operates. 
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[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
B. Identification Strategy 
To test the conformity of rate decisions with the predictions of finance, we now proceed to 
consider the awarded ROE as if it were a return on a traded financial asset. If regulators are setting 
ROEs in a manner consistent with risk-adjusted returns, then ROEs should (in theory) behave in a 
manner that is well predicted by asset pricing theory. Our focus here is on the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, for a variety of reasons. First, it is well known and accepted, among both finance 
practitioners and regulators, as a vehicle estimating returns.  (The DCF approach, as noted above, 
has far less acceptance among finance professionals).  Second, unlike other empirical asset pricing 
models (such as Fama-French), the CAPM’s key input – the market equity risk premium (ERP) – 
has readily available forward looking predictions available for it. Such predictions, in fact, are a 
key input into valuation arguments that utilize the CAPM. 
For each observed rate case with an ROE finding, we consider the following 
specification:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1 ∙ ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
 
where �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� represents the awarded ROE spread over the risk free rate for utility i at time 
t, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a series of controls (discussed below, and including potential experimental 
manipulations), and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is an error term.  The term ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in (2) is the predicted spread of utility i’s 
stock at time t, per the predictions of an underlying asset-pricing model. For the CAPM, this 
predicted spread is given by the well-known expression: 
?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� (3) 
 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the utility stock’s risk relative to the market (its “beta”), 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the stock’s abnormal 
deviation from the CAPM (or its “alpha”), and 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� is the expected market equity risk 
premium (ERM).  Although the pure version of CAPM predicts that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 0 for all securities, we 
allow for deviations based on empirical relationships observable at the time of the rate hearing.  
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Thus, if regulators are following the dictates of the CAPM, we would expect 𝑐𝑐0 = 𝛾𝛾 = 0, and 𝑐𝑐1 =1.  In all the regressions below, we utilize estimated utility- and time-specific values of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, using firm-level data if the utility is public and industry proxies otherwise. In the first set of 
regressions presented, we omit all non-CAPM controls; but later we include various controls that 
pertain to the commission hearing the rate hearing, including political party composition, size, and 
fraction elected versus appointed, as well as size and capital structure data on the utility. (This is 
the null hypothesis that we test—and reject—below.) 
As noted above, the strong prediction of the CAPM is that the coefficient 𝑐𝑐1 should be 1 
while 𝑐𝑐0 should be zero. We acknowledge, as others have noted, the CAPM may under-predict 
returns for smaller-capitalization firms, as well as firms that have extreme market-to-book ratios, 
inducing a non-zero estimate of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. However, we attempt to control for this by including estimates 
of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 when available. In any event, our interest is only tangentially related to size premia, which 
would tend to bias our results in the opposite direction from what we see in the data. 
Our analysis explores a variety of estimation approaches for (2).  For publicly traded 
utilities, we utilized both raw estimated 60-month alphas and betas (as of the month of the rate 
order), as well as a blended “Ibbotson-adjusted” values of alpha and beta which is a weighted 
average of the raw beta and/or alpha (weight 2/3) with industry wide counterparts (weight 1/3). 
(For non-traded utilities, the industry alpha and beta prevailing at the time of the PUC order are 
used.)  For the ERP, we consider both the historical ERP measure and the (so-called) Supply-Side 
measure, both widely employed by financial professionals and provided by Duff and Phelps on an 
annual basis.43  All of these measures would have been available to the PUC at the time of each 
rate order. 
C. Results 
Consider our first set of regressions pictured in Table 3, which reports on a basic set of 
CAPM regressions (with standard errors clustered at the state level, as in all remaining 
regressions).  Note from the Table that our key coefficient of interest, 𝑐𝑐1, is not only nowhere 
near 1.0 (as predicted by the CAPM), but it is consistently negative in value.  In all 
                                                          
43 In all cases, we utilize the ERP predictions from Duff & Phelps, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) 
Yearbook (2005-16) (now published by Wiley & Sons). 
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specifications, the estimate of 𝑐𝑐1 is statistically and economically distinct from its predicted 
value (of 1) at any conventional confidence level.  In addition, the constant (𝑐𝑐0) in the regression 
appears to reflect an enormous abnormal return embedded in the awarded ROE, above and 
beyond abnormal deviations predicted through empirical alpha values.  The inconsistency of 
awarded ROEs with CAPM, moreover, persists even in the presence of state and year fixed 
effects.  We view this as strong evidence that whatever regulators are doing, they are not 
generally applying accepted asset pricing models to generate forward-looking estimates of equity 
cost of capital. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 If PUCs are not adhering, on average, to asset-price mimicking behavior, then what may 
be driving their decisions?  Table 4 expands the analysis of Table 3 by adding a variety of firm-
level and / or PUC-level controls, as well as a control for electricity rate cases.  (All regressions 
in the Table utilize Ibbotson-adjusted Beta estimates and Supply-Side ERPs).   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Most of the firm-level attributes (log of assets, trailing ROE, and debt-equity ratio) appear to have 
little predictive power.  While some of these factors are unsurprising, it is notable that leverage 
too appears not to have predictive value as to awarded ROEs, particularly in the light of the fact 
that realized ROEs tend to be persistently and positively related to leverage of all firms, including 
utilities as shown in Figure 5 below (generated from all public utilities represented in the PUF 
data).  In the regulated setting, however, higher debt-equity ratios appear to have no systematic 
relationship to awarded ROEs.  As discussed in the next section, the invariance of ROE to leverage 
may play an important role in providing incentives for utilities to avoid levering up strategically, 
in order to obtain an attractive ROE but also incur greater degrees of financial distress. 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
Commission-level controls in Table 4 appear to provide some parts of the story behind 
regulatory rate setting.  Note first that the number of commissioners on the PUC tends to predict 
a small reduction in “abnormal” awarded ROEs, possibly reflecting the possibility that larger 
commissions will are more likely to have either commissioners or staff with financial expertise.  
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In addition, the percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower awarded ROEs, with 
completely elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower returns on equity 
than completely appointed ones.  This electoral effect may represent the cost that commissioners 
pay with rate payers by setting rates too high, and/or the greater impediments to regulatory 
capture by elected commissioners.  Party-affiliated commissioners also appear to be associated 
with lower ROEs, though this effect does not appear to persist with the introduction of state and 
year fixed effects, which are likely to absorb party-associated effects for relative stable PUC 
political compositions (as many are).  
Note once again, however, that just as in Table 3, the inclusion of a variety of controls in 
Table 4 does not attenuate the strong inconsistencies of ROE announcements and the predictions 
of CAPM.  As in Table 3, awarded ROEs appear to move in the opposite direction as systematic 
risk, and awarded ROE spreads still have an unexplained component of around 7.5%.   
D. Expertise and Training: A Quasi-Field Experiment 
Although PUC commissioners and staff may be incentivized by a variety of factors other 
than asset-pricing concerns when setting rates, another factor deserving attention is whether the 
regulatory decision makers simply lack the expertise to evaluate finance-based arguments, 
thereby causing them to look to orthogonal factors.  In other words, is the stark deviation from 
the predictions of CAPM illustrated above an artifact of some type of regulatory limitation on 
competence or receptivity to finance, or is it more reflective of inadequate training of regulators? 
Our data allow us to test this question, using a fortuitous natural experiment.  The 
Institute for Regulatory Law & Economics (IRLE) is a regulatory training endeavor sponsored 
by the University of Colorado Law School’s Silicon Flatirons Center as a means of supporting 
thoughtful regulatory decision-making.  From 2004-2016, the IRLE hosted an annual one-week 
summer workshop for state public utility commissioners and staff, with the goal of educating 
regulators about how to use economic analysis within the regulatory decision making.44 The 
IRLE advertised its annual program as follows:  
Each May, the IRLE hosts a seminar geared towards educating state regulators about 
economic analysis of regulatory policy issues. Notably, the Institute distills the 
                                                          
44 The institute did not host a Summer Workshop in 2015. 
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critical law and economics issues that arise in closely-regulated network industries 
and presents them in a coherent fashion. To present its curriculum, the IRLE draws 
on the expertise of leading academics, practitioners, and scholars. In short, the IRLE 
teaches regulators how to appreciate insights that emerge from important economic 
principles and concepts as well as how to apply them to regulatory situations in 
network industries.45 
For the first four years of the workshop, finance was not included as part of the curriculum; but 
beginning in 2008, the IRLE began to devote an entire day (6 hours of lecture time) to finance, 
where regulators were exposed to some of the key components to discounted cash flow analysis 
and the CAPM, using examples from actual rate cases to motivate discussion.46 
Although participants in the workshop were required to opt into attendance (and thus they 
self-selected), the mid-stream introduction of finance content helps to address some of the 
concerns that one might have with selection bias. In several baseline specifications, we compare 
treated commissions (i.e., those who attended) with untreated ones (those who never attended). 
However, in other specifications we consider the effect of finance training solely within the 
population of commissions that opted the IRLE workshops (effectively constructing a “placebo” 
group consisting of those PUCs who opted into the workshop but did not receive finance training 
in the first four years). Table 5 summarizes the first year in which the commissions in our 
observation sample attended IRLE’s program, as well as the first year the commission received 
“treatment” by finance training.  (In some cases, the commission attended the program but did not 
receive finance treatment because their years of attendance pre-dated the provision of finance). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Our identification strategy comes from the following specification:  
�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐1 ∙ ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐3 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝑐𝑐4 ∙ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4)  
 
This specification is identical to equation (2), except for the addition of (a) a diff-in-diff shift 
variable 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 that takes on the value of 1 if any member/staffer of PUC i has received 
                                                          
45 IRLE Website: https://siliconflatirons.org/events/institute-for-regulatory-law-and-economics-irle/  
46 In the interests of full disclosure, one of the co-authors of this study (Talley) delivered the finance course in every 
year it was offered. 
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finance training treatment on or before year t, and (b) a slope-shifting interaction term 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ ?̂?𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, which allows for a training-induced change in the coefficient on the slope of the 
expected spread of the utility. The treatment effect from CAPM training would thus be reflected 
in coefficients 𝑐𝑐3 and 𝑐𝑐4. Given the deviations from CAPM found in Tables 3 and 4 above, training 
would induce regulatory decisions more line with finance theory if 𝑐𝑐3 < 0 and/or 𝑐𝑐4 > 0.  (Note 
in addition that the average combined CAPM coefficients for treated commissions would be a 
summed shift effect of (𝑐𝑐0 + 𝑐𝑐3) and a summed slope effect of (𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐4).)  
Tables 6 summarizes our results.47 In the Table, the left panel considers all untreated PUCs, 
as a control, regardless of whether they opted to attend the IRLE program; the right panel retains 
only those PUCs that participated in the IRLE program (a universe that includes a “placebo” group 
never treated with finance training). As the Table illustrates, finance training results in some 
moderate effects on later ROE setting.   First, the effect of finance training on the shift parameter 
(𝑐𝑐3) is consistently negative and statistically significant in the presence of various utility-level 
controls.  Its economic significance (around 50 bps) is also notable, representing just under one 
standard deviation in raw announced spreads (see Table 1). Second, finance training also alters the 
CAPM slope coefficient the predicted direction, albeit modestly. The point estimates of the slope 
parameter (𝑐𝑐4) is mildly positive, but not statistically significant; and the point estimate is high 
enough that, when combined with the baseline slope estimate, treated PUCs exhibit a very slight 
positive relationship between systematic risk and awarded  ROE.   The electoral responsiveness of 
commissions appears to persist in the presence of treatment, but the size effect disappears in the 
right panel of regressions, suggesting that PUCs seeking treatment (regardless of whether they 
received finance training) tended to alter their decision making less as a function of size than 
untreated commissions. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Two caveats deserve explicit attention before proceeding. First, we cannot rule out whether 
our findings as to the trainability of PUC regulators and staffs turned critically on the specific 
design of the treatment offered.  The training program, part of a larger week-long immersion 
program in regulatory law and economics, was consistently staffed by substantially the same 
                                                          
47 As with the previous results, Table 6 clusters standard errors at the state level. 
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faculty over the observation period, proceeding in roughly consistent sequence. Although we 
observe program where finance training was not part of the curriculum (a convenient form of 
heterogeneity for selection-bias correction), our data therefore still do not permit us to distinguish 
about whether a peculiar aspect of this specifc program was particularly effective.48 
Second, to the extent that training is effective, we want to be cautious about whether greater 
fidelity to asset pricing is itself conducive to overall welfare concerns.  Indeed, to the extent that 
accurate risk-adjusted returns adjudication crowds out other laudable social policy goals, the 
trainability of regulators may ultimately be normatively undesirable, at least for certain plausible 
alternative objectives regulators may pursue (such as dynamic incentive provision). We note, 
however, that while training tends to dampen several other predictive factors in rate-setting, they 
remain in the picture, and thus it does not necessarily follow that better risk pricing necessarily 
crowds out other goals. 
All told, we view these results as evidence that there exists some potential to train legal 
decision-makers to utilize the concepts of finance.  We note that the effect is concentrated in the 
shift parameter, and that it is still a fraction of the size of the abnormal portion of the ROE spread. 
Training evidently has mild effects on PUCs’ responsiveness to prevailing systematic risk through 
the slope parameter. It may be possible that a multi-day or otherwise more immersive form of 
training would have even greater effects, but our data do not permit us to unpack this possibility. 
 
  
                                                          
48 We note, for example, that finance training component in all observed years was provided by a single instructor 
(co-author Talley). 
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IV. Conclusion 
Under U.S. law, a public utility is entitled to earn a return on the value it employs for the 
convenience of the public equal to that made on investments in other businesses which are attended 
by corresponding risks.49 We conducted an empirical analysis of rates awarded by PUCs in the 
U.S. and in Canada over a twelve year period (2005-2016), in order to assess the relationship of 
awarded rates of return on equity to standard asset pricing models adjusting expected rates of return 
with anticipated risks. Our analysis demonstrates that rate setting practices adopted by PUCs 
diverge appreciably (even violently) from the predictions of financial economics across numerous 
dimensions. 
Instead, our analysis suggests that current regulatory practice more plausibly reflects an amalgam 
of other desiderata that include political goals, incentive provision, insufficient financial expertise 
and regulatory capture. We identify some factors may be at play, including the possibility that 
regulators’ behavior reflects objectives that are either orthogonal or opposed to precise risk-return 
calibration, such as serving political constituencies, providing dynamic incentives, and possibly 
even regulatory capture. We find evidence that the structural composition of the commission is 
correlated with the awarded rates: The percent of the commission that is elected predicts lower 
awarded ROEs, with completely elected commission tending to award up to 115 basis points lower 
returns on equity than completely appointed ones.  We additionally conjecture that the divergence 
of observed regulatory behavior from asset-pricing fundamentals may be due (in part) to a lack of 
financial valuation expertise among regulators. To test this conjecture, we study a unique field 
experiment that exposed commissioners and their staffs to immersion training in finance. We find 
evidence that treated PUCs began to issue ROE rulings that were (moderately) more aligned with 
standard asset pricing theory than those of untreated placebo groups. 
  
                                                          
49 Bluefield Waterworks v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). Accord FPC v. Hope Natural Gas 
Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
  
 
Figure 1: Histogram of Awarded ROEs (Source: Public Utilities Fortnightly, 2005-2016) 
 
  Combined Gas Electric 
Mean 10.113 10.014 10.188 
S.D. 0.650 0.635 0.647 
5% 9.14 9.05 9.23 
25% 9.75 9.69 9.80 
50% 10.10 10.10 10.15 
75% 10.50 10.40 10.50 
95% 11.00 10.85 11.25 
N Obs 844 364 482 
Table 1: Awarded ROE by Utility Type 
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State Obs Mean S.D. Min Max State Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
AB 4 9.288 1.324 8.3 11.1 NC 10 10.460 0.306 10 11 
AK 8 10.817 1.441 9.3 12.875 ND 9 10.350 0.483 9.5 10.75 
AL 4 12.275 1.703 10.8 13.75 NE 4 9.925 0.395 9.6 10.4 
AR 14 9.829 0.285 9.4 10.25 NH 5 9.636 0.076 9.5 9.67 
AZ 12 9.938 0.490 9.5 11 NJ 10 9.920 0.283 9.55 10.3 
CA 24 10.797 0.689 8.5 11.6 NL 1 8.500 . 8.5 8.5 
CO 21 10.131 0.988 7.53 12 NM 7 9.906 0.293 9.48 10.27 
CT 13 9.486 0.498 8.75 10.25 NV 15 10.163 0.420 9.3 10.7 
DC 5 9.555 0.284 9.25 10 NY 44 9.514 0.464 9 10.7 
DE 6 9.908 0.213 9.7 10.25 OH 13 10.258 0.301 9.84 10.65 
FL 15 10.740 0.539 10 11.75 OK 13 10.280 0.343 9.5 10.75 
GA 6 10.728 0.346 10.12 11.15 ONT 12 8.958 0.480 8.35 9.43 
HI 9 10.200 0.570 9 10.7 OR 22 9.882 0.247 9.4 10.175 
IA 11 10.609 0.835 10 12.2 PA 3 10.267 0.231 10 10.4 
ID 15 10.170 0.595 9.5 12 QUE 1 8.900 . 8.9 8.9 
IL 53 9.807 0.560 8.72 10.68 RI 5 9.960 0.508 9.5 10.5 
IN 33 10.002 0.613 7 10.5 SC 11 11.009 0.717 10.2 12 
KS 9 9.756 0.422 9.1 10.4 SD 1 9.250 . 9.25 9.25 
KY 16 10.252 0.228 9.8 10.63 TN 5 10.206 0.166 10.05 10.48 
LA 23 10.648 0.477 9.95 11.25 TX 24 9.869 0.254 9.5 10.4 
MA 18 9.737 0.319 9.2 10.35 UT 11 10.160 0.294 9.8 10.61 
MD 23 9.767 0.327 9.31 11 VA 28 10.118 0.438 9.5 11.5 
ME 7 9.929 0.766 8.45 11 VT 7 9.923 0.427 9.45 10.7 
MI 39 10.472 0.323 9.9 11.15 WA 29 10.045 0.285 9.5 10.4 
MN 31 10.054 0.682 7.16 10.88 WI 86 10.457 0.414 9.45 11.2 
MO 23 10.132 0.479 9.5 11.25 WV 1 9.750 . 9.75 9.75 
MS 5 9.587 0.315 9.225 10.07 WY 18 10.144 0.507 9.5 10.9 
MT 2 9.650 0.212 9.5 9.8             
Table 2: Awarded ROE by Jurisdiction (Incudes some Canadian Provinces) 
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Figure 2a: Awarded ROEs, by Order Date 
 
 
Figure 2b: Awarded ROE spreads over 20-yr US Treasuries, by Order Date 
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Figure 3a: Utility Alphas, by Month (60-month trailing CAPM estimation). Source: CRSP 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Utility Betas, by Month (60-month trailing CAPM estimation). Source: CRSP 
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Figure 4: Excess of Awarded ROE over Mean Realized ROE (Two-Year Lead)  
  
Mean = 1.79; Med = 1.45; SD = 3.32; IQR: [0.16, 2.91]
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Figure 5. Mean Realized ROE (Two-Year Lead) and D/E Ratio. Source: Compustat, 2005-2016. 
(***=significance at the 0.001 level) 
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State 
1st 
IRLE 
Year 
1st Finance 
Year State 
1st 
IRLE 
Year 
1st Finance 
Year   
  AL     MT 2004 2011   
  AK 2004 2008 NE       
  AZ 2010 2010 NV       
  AR 2004 2016 NH 2005     
  CA 2004   NJ       
  CO 2004 2008 NM 2005     
  CT 2011 2011 NY       
  DC 2004 2009 NC 2004 2016   
  DE     ND 2004 2010   
  FL 2004 2012 OH 2012 2012   
  GA     OK 2005     
  HI     OR 2004 2013   
  ID     PA 2013 2013   
  IL 2005 2008 RI 2005 2008   
  IN 2004 2008 SC 2005 2009   
  IA 2004 2011 SD 2004 2013   
  KS 2004 2011 TN 2006 2011   
  KY 2012 2012 TX 2005     
  LA     UT       
  ME     VT 2007 2008   
  MD 2004   VA       
  MA 2004 2008 WA 2007 2012   
  MI 2007 2009 WV       
  MN 2008 2008 WI 2005 2009   
  MS     WY       
  MO 2004 2010         
  
Table 5. Finance Training in IRLE Summer Institute, by (a) First Year of 
Attendance; and (b) First Year attendees received Finance Training.   
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